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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SURGICAL SUPPLY CENTER, INC. 
a corporation; PROPES S I 0 N A L 
PHARMACY, INC., a corporation, 
et al Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defendants . 
. Case No. 7390 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF· 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 14, 1948, identical letters were directed to the 
Surgical Supply Center, Inc. and Professional Pharmacy, Inc., 
two Utah corporations, by a representative in the Utah Depart-
ment of Employment Security, notifying them that their con-
tribution rates beginning October 1, 1947, (the date when each 
corporation commenced operations) would be 2. 7 percent. 
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On May 24,- 1948, the company, through its attorney, 
requested an extension of time in which to file a formal appe~l. 
The request was granted, and on June 5, 1948, a written appeal 
was directed to the Department. The matter was received by 
the Appeals Referee on June 14, 1948, and on August 31, 
1948, written notices of the time and place of hearing were 
directed to the parties. On September 1, 1948, the companies 
requested a postponement of the hearing. The request .was 
granted, and the matter was set for September 14, 1948, but was 
further postponed and was heard on September 22, 1948. The 
Appeals Referee, in his decision, dated September 23, 1948, 
affirmed the deterr:nination of the Department. 
On September 30, 1948, the two corporations appealed 
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
under the provisions of Section 42-=2a_-10, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, as amended by Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1949. On 
the 17th day of August, 1949, the Board of Review issued its 
decision denying any further hearing and thereby sustaining 
the decision of the Appeals Referee. 
On the 27th day of August, 1949, the Surgical Supply 
Center and Professional Pharmacy filed a Petition for Writ 
of Review in this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December, 1938, Mr. James F. Robinson became the 
sole owner of the Professional Pharmacy in Salt Lake City, 
and in November, 1942, he also became owner of the Surgical 
Supply Center in Salt Lake City. On January 3, 1944, Robinson 
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entered -into a p~rtnership agreement with two of his em-
ployees who were each given 10 percent interest in the con1-
bined business of the Surgical Supply Center and the Profes'" 
sional Phannacy. Each of the two undertakings, the Surgical 
Suppiy Center and the Professional Pharmacy, maintained a 
separate set of books, records and accounts and had a separate 
bank account and was operated as a separate unit. The profits 
to the partners were distributed on the basis of the combined 
income from the two operating units. 
On October 1, 1947, a bill of sale signed by the partners 
transferred the assets of the Surgical Supply Center to the 
Surgical Supply Center, Incorporated, a Utah corporation, 
and at the same time by means of another bill of sale signed 
by the partners, the assets of the Professional Pharmacy were 
transferred to the Professional Pharmacy, Incorporat~d, a Utah 
corporation. The proportionate interests of the former partners 
ren1ained the same except that there were two other individuals 
who each held one share of stock in each corporation. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT 
NEITHER THE SURGICAL SUPPLY CENTER, IN-
-CORPORATED, NOR THE PROFESSIONAL PHARMACY, 
INCORPORATED, WERE QUALIFIED EMPLOYERS 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT ON OCTOBER 1, 1947, SINCE NEITHER 
ACQUIRED ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL TH~ ASSETS 
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. For some years-prior to 1947 the Utah Employment Security 
Act, Chapter 42-2a, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, 
contained no provision for reduced rates for employers for the 
purpose of paying unemployment compensation contributions. 
The Act merely provided as follows: 
Section 42-2a~ 7 (b) ( 2), Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
tc(b) (2) Each employer shall pay contributions 
equal to 2. 7 percent of wages paid by him during the 
calendar year 1941 and during each calendar year there-
after with respect to employment occurring after De-
cember 31, 1940." 
Section 7 of the Act provided for a study of experience 
rating. 
The 1947 legislature enacted Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 
1947, providing two employer experience rating formulre. 
Section 42-2a-7(b) was amended by adding: 
u ( 3) Each employer shall, except as provided in sub-
section (c) of this section, pay contributions equal to 
2.7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar 
years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947, 
and prior to January 1, 1950. 
« « ( 4) Each employer shall, except as provided in ·sub-
section (d) of this section; pay contributions equal to 
2. 7 percent of the wages paid by him during each of the 
calendar years occurring after December 31, 1949." 
The court's attention is called to the fact that ( 3) above 
quoted provides for a system of rates for the period commenc-
ing July 1, 1947, and ending December 31, 1949, and that ( 4) 
provi9es for a system of rating to go into effect for the years 
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after_ Decem~ 31,.- 1949. .The f:Ou-rt's attention is :called to 
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1949, which, among other things, 
amended Section 42-2a-7 by changing the· above. quoted para-
graph ( 3) of subsection (b) to· read as .follows: 
tt ( 3) Each employer shall, except as provided in 
.subsection (c) of this section, pay contributions·.equal 
to 2.7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar 
years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947." 
Paragraph ( 4) above quoted was deleted from the section 
so that the system of rates, successorship, etc., which was 
previously provided to take effect January 1, 1950, was deleted 
~ 
from the Act, and the system-as established in subsection. (c) , 
with some amendments, remains· in effect after December 31, 
1949. The Act, therefore, ·establishes a standard rate for the 
payment of contributions, ( 3) set out above, ·equal to 2.7 
percent of wages. 
Section 42-2a-7 (c), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
amended by C~apter 56, Laws of Utah, 1947, established a 
formula whereby ttqualified employers" who met certain con-
ditions set forth there would pay a rate less than 2. 7 percent. 
(c) ( 1) (C) defined qualified employer as:. 
(((C) 'Qualified employer' means any employer who: 
was an employer as 'defined in this act during each of 
the thirteen consecutive calendar quarters imnl.ediately 
preceding the computation date; and had employment 
in each of the three completed calendar years im-
mediately preceding the computation date; and/- v1ith. 
respect to such three calendar years had :fi_l~d. all con-
tribution reports prescribed ·by. the Commt.ss1on;. ~?-~ 
'. ~ .. :. :;. · · ( excepf for ·amounts due ·as determined pursuant ·to 
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· audit or as set forth on a notice of contribution de-
ficiency prepared by the Commission and pertaining 
to the quarter ending December 31 immediately pre-
ceding the computation date) had paid all contributions 
thereon by the cut-off date. If an employer has acquired 
all or substantially all the assets of another employer 
and such other employer had discontinued operations 
upon such acquisition, the period of liability of both 
employers during such period shall be jointly considered 
for_ all purposes of t4is section." 
We find, therefore, that in order to· have been classified 
as a ((qualified employer" so that the experience raing formula 
would be applied as of July 1, 1947-the first rate reduction 
applying only to the last six months of 1947-any employer 
must ( 1) have been an employer as defined in the Act during 
each of the 13 consecutive calendar quarters immediately 
preceding the computation date (the first computation date 
being January 1, 1947); (2) the employer must have had em-
ployment in each of the three completed calendar years im-
mediately preceding the computation date; (3) the employer 
with respect to such three calendar years must have filed all 
contribution reports prescribed by the Commission; and ( 4) 
the employer must have paid all contributions thereon by the 
cut-off date Cc ccut-off date' means April 30 with respect to 
contribution rates effective for the period July 1, 1947, to 
December 31, 1947, and thereafter February 15 next following 
the computation date"). 
Or in the case where an employer acquired all or substan-
tially all the assets of another employer,· the period of liability 
of both employers during the 13 consecutive calendar quarters 
preceding the computation date, would be jointly considered 
. 8 
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for all purposes of Section 7 provided it was shown. that the 
predecessor employer had discontinued operations upon such 
acquisition. 
It can be adn1itted that had the partnership continued 
operating the Surgical Supply Center and the Professional 
Pharmacy, it would have continued to be a qualified employer 
as it was on July 1, 1947. It may also be admitted that had the 
partnership transferred all of . the assets of the two operating 
units to a single corporation and the partnership had discon-
tinued operations, the successor corporation would have suc-
ceeded to the reduced rate \vhich \vithout such transfer would 
have been attributable to the partnership. 
(It is unnecessary to discuss the formula inasmuch as the 
question of the method of its application is not in issue in this 
matter. It appears to be sufficient to state that rates are com-
puted upon the basis of the percentage decrease of annual pay-
rolls over the 3-year period; the percentage decrease of quarterly 
payrolls over the 3-year peroid; and the length of time_ the 
employer was subject to the Act). 
Some 38 states have passed statutes providing for the 
transfer of merit rating to successors in certain cases. Of these, 
4 states have provided that an acquisition ttof all or a part 
thereof'' was sufficient to establish successorship; 13 states 
require an acquisition of ((substantially all"; and 18 states 
allow successorship .only if the trade, business, or nail" of the 
assets of the predecessor were acquired. 
The 1949 Legislature, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 194-9~ 
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((If an employer has · acquir.ed a clearly segregable 
and identifiable part of another employer's enterprise, 
the period of liability attributable to such transferred 
part of an employers' enterprise shall be considered 
jointly with the period of liability . of the acquiring 
employer for all purposes of this section, provided, that 
the acquiring employer's rate for the period beginning 
with the date_ of the transfer and ending with the next 
following effective date ·of contribution rates shall be 
that rate which is assigned pursuant to the regulations 
of the Commission adopted under the provisions of 
this section, which provide for the transfer of a rate 
by an employer to his successor. 
((An employer who transfers all or a segregable part 
of his operations from another state to this state shall 
be deemed to te a (qualified employer' within the 
meaning of this _ section as of the computation date 
next following the transfer, provided: that he has paid 
wages subject to the federal unemployment tax act for 
tv1elve consecutive completed calendar quarters im-
meditely preceding the computation date; that he 
notifies the commission of the transfer of operations 
prior to the computation date; that he certifies to the 
Commission all information with respect to the trans-
ferred operations which the Commission determines 
to be necessary. (Wages,' paid in connection with such 
· transferred operations shall be deemed to have been 
paid in this state for the purposes of this section." 
There can be no validity, however, in an argument that 
this 1949 am-endment was retroactive to July 1, 1947, and 
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial 
Department, on December 29, 1948, so held, in effect when 
interpreting a similar amendment in the case of the News-
paper P.M., Inc., Marshall Field and Marshall Field, Jr., indi-
vidually,- doing business as Field Publications vs. Edward Corsi, 
10 
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Industrial Commissioner (CCH N.Y. Paragraph 8520.) The 
court stated: 
uPrior to 19.:17 the requirements for qualification for 
credit made no provision for and did not include an 
employer's discontinuance of operations upon his dis-
posal and another's consequent acquisition qf a sever-
able part of his business activities.. That the equity 
and fairness of so doing was recently recognized and 
provided for (quoting New York Court, changes) 
does not permit us to make that measure retroactive. 
~fo uphold appellant's contention we would, in effe~t, 
be doing that. The liberal construction contended for 
Vlould register the legislative grant of a new right 
superfluous. The remedial nature of a new right be-
sto,ved affords it no retroactive reach. (Jacobus vs. 
Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235) ." 
The court held that 1fr. Field, when he disposed of his 
P.1tL Newspaper business to the Field Publications a-nd con-
tinued in the newspaper business of publishing the Chicago-
Sun, and in connection therewith, continued in New York 
City the maintenance of a news gathering and transmitting 
organization, did not discontinue operations within the meaning 
of the applicable statute in 1942, the date of the transfer. 
We again call this court's attention to the fact that the 
1947 Utah statute contained a similar provision that a successor 
could not succeed to the experience of the predecessor unless 
"such other ernployer had discontinued operations upon such 
acquisition." (Sec. (7) (c).) It is our position that the Utah 
statute establishes a standard rate of contributions of 2. 7 per-
cent and that it is a well-settled principle of law that in order 
to take advantage of a statutory provision (for any reduction 
11 
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in rate) .:the;. employer must prove to the satisfaction of . the 
administering body that it has met all of the statutory specifi-
cations. The statute is to be const.rued as written, having in 
mind its evident purpose, whether the end result is considered 
by some to be economically good or bad. 
The statute, as it existed on July 1, 1947, was an integral 
part of the statute just as is the 1949 amendment permitting 
the transfer of merit rating in the case where an employer 
acquires a clearly segregable and identifiable part of another 
employer's enterprise. (55. Yale L. J. 218, 242). Also, there 
can be no merit to the argument that the Surgical Supply Com-
pany and Professional Pharmacy prior to their incorporation 
were separate employing units. 
Section 42-2a-19, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines_ 
employing unit as follows: 
cc (h) (Employing unit' means any individual or type 
of organization, including any partnership, association, 
trust, estate, joint stock ccr:-~pany, insurance company 
or corporatioh, vY"hether don1estic or foreign, or the 
··receiver, ·trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor 
of any ·of the foregoing, or the legal representative 
of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to 
January 1, 1935, had one or more individuals perform-
ing services for it within this state. 
cc ( 1) All individuals performing services within this 
· state for any employing unit which maintains two or 
more. separate establishments within this state shall 
be deemed to be performing services for a single 
employing unit for all the purposes of this act. 
(( ( 2) Each i!ldividual employed · to perform or to 
assist in .. performing the work of any persori in the 
12 
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service of an employing unit shall be deemed -to be 
engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes 
of this act whether such individual was hired or paid 
directly by such employing unit or by such person, 
provided the employing unit had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the "'ork." 
As set forth in the above-quoted section, all of the indi-
viduals performing services in the two separate establis~ments 
were deemed to be performing services for the general partner-
ship, which, 'vithin the above definition was the tcemploying · 
unit."· Any rate computations which were made were made 
on the basis of the combined payrolls of the separate operating 
units. Under the provisions of the Act, the separate operating 
units were not considered as having earned a reduced rate. 
The New Hampshire Employment Security Act prior 
to April 30, 1945, contained no ·provision for the transfer of 
experience rating, but effective April 30, 1945, the law was 
amended to permit a transfer of rates. In the case of C. A. 
Lund & Compa1;1y vs. Rolfe, 93 N. H. 280, 41 A. (2d) 226 
( 1945) , dealing with the period prior to the amendment, · 
which became effective- April 30, 1945, the court held that 
' a partnership which took over the business of the corporation 
was not entitled to the merit rating record of the corporation 
for purposes of computing the partnership's _unemployment 
compensation contribution rate even though the members of 
the partnership consisted of 4 of the 6 stockholders of the 
former corporation and no change in personnel or type of 
business conducted took place at the time the partnership 
took over the business of the corporation. 
13 
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The New Hampshire court further held, in the case of 
Sulloway, et al vs. Rolfe, 47 A: ( 2d) 109 ( 1946), that where 
a member of a partnership died and was replaced by a new 
member, a new employing unit was thereby created and there-
fore such employing unit was not entitled to pay unemployment 
compensation contributions at a rate based upon the combined 
experience of it and its predecessor even though the partner 
had agreed that in the event of death or resignation of any 
partner, the remaining partners would continue the practice 
of law together as partners and that the partnership should 
not terminate because of such death or resignation. 
In the case of Seavey Hardware Company vs. Riley, 95 
N. H .... , 67 A. (2d) 430, decided June 28, 1949, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court held that a purchaser of one of 
two hardware stores owned by a partnership was not entitled 
to the merit rating of the partnership under the Unemployment 
Compensation Law since the store purchased did not con-
stitute substantially all of the assets of the partnership. The 
court overruled the contention that the partnership cotnprised 
two employing units and that each of them was an employer 
under ,the law. In answer to the contention of the plaintiff that 
the partnership comprised two employing units, one the Seavey 
Hardware Company, and the other Young's Hardware Store, 
and that each of these units was itself an ttemployer" under 
the Act, the court said: 
t tThis argument ignores the express provtston con-
tained in subsection 1-G: (All individuals performing 
services within this state for any employing unit which 
J!laintains two or more separate establishments within 
the state shall be deemed to be employed b_y a single 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
·_,: ·employing unit for all purposes of this .chapter.' The 
Fountain partnership, although it had two separate 
stores or establishments in Dover and Exeter re-
spectively, was a single employing_ unit and so one. 
employer. Cartersville Candlewick vs. Huiet, 50 S. E. 
( 2d) (Ga.) 64 7. It is clear that the terms of subsection 
1-G in the definition of an employing unit expressly 
include a partnership and neither expressly nor PY 
implication refer to a store in and of itself as an em~ 
playing unit. The Dover store itself was not an enF 
playing unit or employer within the meaning of the 
Act and had no merit rating that could be acquired 
by Thomas C. Dunnington. 
ttThe plaintiffs position is· fallacious 'in stating that 
the Seavey Hardware Company was one employing 
unit and. that the other was· Young's Hardware Store. 
Employing unit is defined in terms of the individual or 
type of organization behind a trade or business rather 
than in terms of the physical units and the econ9mic 
features of the enterprise. In Sulloway vs. Rolfe, 
supt~'-, 87, the theory that an employing unit was the 
same because the organization qf a certain .law office 
was the same aud it was fair to say that there was iden-
tity of enterprise and other business and economic . 
factors, was reje~ted. It \vas held that since there was 
a change in the_ personnel of the partnership, the em-
ploying unit was new and that under the statute as 
it. then was, the new partnership was not entitled to 
the merit rating of the predecessor. So, in the present 
case the contention that the Dover Store was an em-
ploying unit, cannot be accepted. The employing unit 
was the Fountain partnership, which also owned· the·· 
store in Exeter. It has sometimes been stated that the 
phrase c employing unit' is defined in terms of the 
venturer rather than of the venture. By ernploying 
urut is meant the master rather than the servants, the 
owner rather than the ·business, the- one ultimately 
liable for the obligations of· the organizatiohs~ 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c CThe claim of the plaintiff that the defendant cshould 
have divided Fountain's account .into two sections, one 
applicable to each establishment,' is error. The statute 
provides for a separate account for e4ch employer and 
accordingly for a separate rating for each . . . These 
· ·merit rating accounts are not severable, nor can a part 
·of the account of the transferor be carried forward by 
the.~uccessor. ·Cartersville Candlewick ys. Huiet, supra; 
_Ned's Auto Supply Company vs. Commission, 313 
Mich. 66; El Queeno Distributing Company vs. 
Christgau, 221 1Yfinn. 197. The accounts and ratings 
cannot be multiplied to correspond to the severable 
portions of an etnployer' s organization, trade, or busi-
ness, either during his ownership or at the time of 
acquisition of a porLon by another or others. If the 
requirements of subsection 6-F are complied with, the 
successor gains the n1erit rating of the transferor. 
Otherwise, he gets no such rating with his transfer. 
The Act does not contemplate the great burden that 
would be cast . upon the defendant by holding that 
accounts should correspond to establishments rather 
than to employers. Also, no provision is. made for 
dividing a merit rating at the time of the acquisition 
of a part of the assets of an employer so that two shall 
be created out of the one that existed . . . For each 
busiii.ess, account and merit rating, there is but one 
employer although he may operate more than one 
establishment; for each employer, only one set of 
contributions as required." 
(The court. then proceeded to set out the definition of 
employing unit,. which corr_esponds to the definition of em-
ploying unit in the Utah Act). 
-Similarly, under the Utah Act, there is in the instant case 
only a single employer, the general partnership, which, until 
the time ofthe:incotporation on or about October 1, 1947, had 
16 
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one account and one n1erit rate (or would have had a merit 
rate had it continued in operation after Septen1ber 30, 1947). 
It is a matter of historical record that Section (7) (c) of 
the statute, and particularly that portion defining a nqualified 
employer,'' hereinabove quoted, was copied verbatim from 
the New York statute as it existed at the time of the 1947 
legislative amendment. It is also true that since the Utah 
statute established a method of reduced rates for employers 
a number of years after most of the other states had expeuenced 
a rate reduction, we are compelled to rely upon decisions of 
those other states in interpreting similar provisions in the U tab 
Act. The New York Act provided: 
HI£ an employer· has acquired all or substantially all 
the assets of another employer and such other employer 
_has discontinued operations on such acquisition, the 
period of liability of both employers during such period 
shall be jointly considered for all purposes of this 
section.'' 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division 3rd 
Department, 275, Appellate Division 881, decided 11ay 4, 
1949, held that a corporation which was engaged in the manu-
facture of radio and telephone parts and which operated a labor-
atory and a patent divisiop in connection therewith and which 
transferred to one of its subsidiaries all of the assets ·used in con.; 
nection with its laboratory division and retained the assets used 
in connection with its patent division was held not entitled to 
transfer its contribution rate to such successor. Although the 
corporation transferred substantially all of its assets; it failed 
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t.o. discontinue:~ business -operations. and ·.thus failed to :comply 
with at least one condition necessary to permit . the transfer 
of its rate credit. The court said: 
' 
cc • ~- • ·The legislature did ·not iri.tend to authorize the 
'transfer· of credits allowed to a qualified· employer to 
anyone except his successor in business who had ac-. 
quir~d al_l or substantially all of his assets, and then 
only if the qualified employer had ceased all business 
operations."'.' 
. So that this court may understand the term ntransfer of 
· credits," the N:ew .. York statute sets up a procedure whereby 
3:t the enq of a rate year the employer is. given a credit or cash 
refund which will, of course, be applied on future contribu-
tions, etc. The. Utah Act does not provide for extra credits. 
It provides that in the succeeding year the qualified employer 
will pay a rate less than 2. 7 percent. So also did the New 
York court rule in the case of the Matter of the Application 
for a Contribution Rate Credit Under Section 5 77 of the 
Unemployt;nept Insurance Law by Hinzmann and Waldmann, 
I~~., Appellant vs. Edward Corsi, Industrial Commissioner, 
qeci~ed Pecember 29, 1948, 274 App. Div. 1009. In this 
case the court decided that the appellant, one of two corpora-
tions formed to take the business of a partnership, did not 
acquire substantially all of the assets of the former partnership 
ven'ture where the total assets of the partnership at the time 
of the transfer were $523,117.89 and the appellant acquired 
only $129,938.98, and therefore that the appellant was not 
entitled to a tax credit for the year in which the transfer took 
plac:~.. The only question which, was presented in that case 
VI~ th..e one: as to whether or .. not the appellant was a ccqualified 
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employer, as defined in the New 'X ork Act. Briefly, the facts 
were as follows: 
For some time prior to April, 1946, Albert 0. Hinzmann 
and Anton Waldmann, as co-partners, were engaged in business 
as joiners and woodworkers. In addition to that venture, the 
partners, commencing Noyember, -1944, and continuing until 
April, 1946, engaged in the business of repairing ships. In 
April, 1946, the partners determined to incorporate their busi-
ness and form two corporations for that purpose. The appel-
lant is one of the two corporations, and the partnership 
transferred to it that portion of the partnership assets carried 
on the partnership books as the woodworking assets. The 
portion of the business relating to the ship repairing was 
transferred to a corporation known as the Hinzmann & Wald-
mann Marine Corporation. The section of the New York Law 
which was involved was the one hereinbefore set forth dealing 
with the acquisition of the assets of another employer. Hinz-
mann and Waldmann, Inc., filed a motion for leave to appeal 
from the above decision. These defendants are advised by 
the State of New York that after consideration of the briefs 
filed pursuant to the motion for leave to appeal, the motion 
was denied. 
So, in the instant case, neither the Surgical Supply Center, 
Incorporated, a corporation, nor the Professional Pharmacy, 
Incorporated, a corporation, acquired substantially all of the 
assets of the general partnership and neither did they acquire 
a majority of the assets. 
In a very recent case decided by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court on November 1, 1949, Auclair Transportation, 
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Inc., vs. William Riley, Commissioner of Labor, it was held 
that a corporation which was formed to take over the business 
of a tn.lcking company was n~t entitled. to the predecessor 
employer's reduced rate where substantially all of the predeces-
sor's assets were not transferred to the successor corporation. 
The court said: 
"The relation between the value of the trucking 
business transferred and the value of the gasoline sta-
tion retained is not so small from either an accounting 
or practical viewpoint that v.;e can say as a matter of 
law that substantially all of the assets of the business 
. . . were acquired by the plaintiff." 
In the Auclair case the facts were that W. M~ Auclair 
owned and operated a motor vehicle trucking business, doing 
business as W. M. Auclair Transportation, and also operated 
a gasoline station for the sale of gasoline and allied products. 
In the trucking business he employed approximately 25 persons, 
and in the .gasoline station he generally had 3 employees. The 
book value of the trucking business was set up at some $34,000 
and the book value of the gasoline station was set up at some 
$4,000. He transferred the trucking operation on January 1, 
1945, to the Auclair Transportation, Inc. He retained pos-
session and ownership of the gasoline station and continued 
to operate the same. The court said: 
nThe issue in this case is whether the plaintiff is 
entitled to the employer merit rating of W. M. Auclair 
upon the transfer described in the agreed facts. The 
unemployment compensation statute provides that the 
experience rating of an employer may be transferred 
to ~an employing unit which acquires the organization, 
trade, or business, or substantially all the assets thereof' 
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t'(We are not concerned with the logic~! and .. economic 
questions for and against experience rating or merit 
rating as it is usually described in this state (55 Yale 
L. J. 218, 242), since it is an integral part of the 
statute. Following the decisions in the Lund vs. Rolfe, 
93 N.H. 280, and Sulloway vs. Rolfe, 94 N.H. 85, 
the quoted statute also made the transfer of m~rit 
rating for unemployment compensation contribution to 
successor employing units (Note 60 Harv. L. Rev. 276) 
an integral part of the law." 
The court further said: 
HThe word (substantially' is merely an elastic term 
·which does not indicate a definite fixed amount of 
percentage. At one extreme it may be said that the 
transfer does not have to be 100 percent; at the other 
extreme, it may be said that the transfer cannot be less 
than 90 percent in the ordinary situation. (See appli-
cation of Hinzmann & \Valdmann, 85 N.Y. S. 149; 
Schul Trading Company vs. Commission, 95 F. (2d) 
404), although a lesser amount has been considered 
sufficient under a statute which is broader_ than otirs. 
Harris vs. Egan, 135 Conn. 102; anno: 4 A. L. R. 2d 
721. · The relation between the value of the trucking 
business transfer and the value of the gasoline station 
retained is not so small from either an accounting or 
practical viewpoint that we can say, as a matter of law, 
that substantially all of the assets of the business of 
W. M. Auclair were acquired by the plaintiff. The 
detern1ination by the defendant that they were not is 
one that could be made upon the facts in this ~ase." 
It will be noted that the Utah Act also carries a statutory 
~quirep1ent5that n9 employer may obtain a rate less than 2.7 
percent (the standard r_ate) unless he had paid all cqntribu-
. . 
tions due a~d h~s filed all reports. The P~nnsylvania statute 
\ ··:.J'\ .,• - . 
contains a' sim~ar provision, and the Court of Common Pleas 
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of .:Dauphin County (No.- 2 Cqmmqnwealth Dock~t 1948) 
in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Molnar 
Brothers Coal Company from the order of .Department of 
Labor and Industry on the Application for Review and Re-
adjustment of the Contribution Rate to the Unemployment 
Compensation Fund, decided March, .1949, that where the 
predecessor had not paid all contributions, the successor was 
not entitled to a reduced rate. The court said: 
((The appellant does not deny its failure to comply 
with the provisions of the law, but attempts first to 
excuse its failure on the ground that the Bureau would 
· not help it make out its 'returns until 1947 and, secondly, 
contends that the provision of paragraph ce' is in the 
. nature of a penalty and as such is unreasonable and 
unlawful .. ~ 
uWhere the appellant falls into error on its other 
contention is that the tax imposed by the statute is 2. 7 
percent and not the unknown and undetermined per-
cent which the appellant would be required to pay had 
it been entitled to an experience rating. 
nln Albright Unemployment Compensation case, 162 
Pa. Superior Ct. 98, 104 ( 1948) Judge Arnold said: 
CPrior to 1943 intervenor's tax was 2.7DJo. C(Experi-. 
ence rating" effected, according to a formula, and 
adjustment of the contribution, which reduced this 
rate, the reduction to become greater as the ((unem-
ployment" of the employer's workmen became less. 
It was a reward and not a penalty, for without uex-
perience rating" the employer's tax would remain at 
2. 7DJo, and in the subsequent amendments of 1943 
and 1945 its tax was fixed at this rate unless ad-
justed.' 
nAs pointed out above the tax is 2. 7DJ0 unless the tax-
payer meets certain requirements among which is the 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
payment of all contributions prior to certain prescribed 
dates which the appellant. did not do. · 
((Being ta reward and not a penalty' the principle~ 
relating to penalties urged upon us by the appellant 
do not apply. The rate was properly set by the Bureau 
for 1947 at 2.70Jo." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the defendants in the instant case contend 
that the plaintiffs have not met the statutory requirements for 
the payment of a rate less than 2.7 percent-the standard rate 
established by the statute-and that, therefore, their rate for 
the period involved in this matter must remain at 2. 7 percent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN, Special 
Assistant Atto1'ney General 
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